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INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing and smart grid technologies increase efficiency and
lower costs to telecommunication and energy consumers.' In addition, smart
grid technology results in lower fossil fuel consumption, and is therefore
considered a green technology. 2 U.S. privacy law has not kept up with the
pace of these technologies, especially in the area of Fourth Amendment protection.' Specifically, search warrants are not required for government access of information remotely stored by third party providers in some cases. 4
This area, known in the industry as digital due process, requires reformation
to the existing Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).
Currently, there is proposed legislation on this topic, which was introduced to the Senate on May 17, 2011 as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011.6 The proposed legislation includes an
updated requirement for a search warrant for government access of information remotely stored by third party providers and addresses some of the
Fourth Amendment protection issues.'
This paper will suggest that the proposed legislation should include
smart grid technology. In addition, this paper will suggest that the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule should be considered
because they may undermine the proposed legislation's goals. The next sec1. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, 31 ENERGY L.J. 81, 85-86
(2010); Jitendra Pal Thethi, Realizing the Value Proposition of Cloud Computing: CIO's
Enterprise IT Strategy for Cloud, INFOSys, 2 (2009), available at http://www.infosys.com/cl
oud/resource-center/documents/realizing-value-proposition.pdf.
2. Energy BarAssociation Panel Discussing the Smart Grid,supra note 1, at 89.
3. Nate Anderson, Bringing US Privacy Law into the Cloud Computing Era, ARS
TECHNICA (Mar. 30, 2010, 5:55 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/
bringing-us-privacy-law-into-the-cloud-computing-era.ars.
4. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
III 2009); Anderson, supra note 3.
5. Anderson, supra note 3; see Electronic Communications Privacy Act § 2703(a)(b)(1).
6. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 11 2th
Cong. §§ 1-3 (2011).
7. Id.§ 3.
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tion of this paper includes a brief and simplified overview of cloud computing and smart grid technologies. Economic and environmental benefits of
both technologies are introduced in this section. Projections and statistics are
included to provide a perspective of the potential reach of the proposed legislation.
The third section of this paper focuses on the current legal standards regarding privacy issues of cloud computing and smart grid technologies.
Constitutional requirements under the Fourth Amendment are discussed.
The outdated provisions of the ECPA are also outlined. This section contains an overview of Katz v. United States8 and the current reasonable expectation of privacy standard. Further, the evasion of the electronic communications privacy issue by the Supreme Court of the United States in City of Ontario v. Quon9 is presented. Following the Quon overview, this section addresses the third party exception doctrine. Finally, this section ends with a
discussion of what would be a reasonable expectation of privacy in the cloud.
The fourth section will provide information on the proposed legislation
that was presented to the Senate on May 17, 2011, which focuses on updating the ECPA and requiring the government to obtain a search warrant for
access to information stored by third parties beyond the existing 180-day
window. 0 This section recommends that because the energy companies will
face similar issues as smart grid technology becomes universally available,
smart grid technology should be included in the proposed legislation. Additionally, some exceptions that may challenge the goals of this bill are addressed in this section. Specifically, the independent source doctrine and the
inevitable discovery rule may provide a circular way around the legislation.
This section will explain both doctrines, and will suggest how these exceptions may provide loopholes that undermine the current proposed legislation's purpose.
The paper concludes with the Obama administration's position on the
changes in the proposed legislation and recaps the economic benefits of the
technologies. The conclusion summarizes the views presented in the third
section.

8. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
9. 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010).
10. Compare Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 § 3,
with Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (a)-(b).
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OVERVIEW OF CLOUD COMPUTING AND SMART GRID TECHNOLOGIES
Cloud Computing

Cloud computing is a technology that allows for an economically more
efficient use of Information Technology (IT) resources." The "cloud" is a
data hosting method and consists of networks, remote data storage, and remote web-based applications.12 Businesses and consumers use "webmail
services, store data online, or . .. use software" applications having functionality in the cloud. 3 The cloud is where the remote IT applications, infrastructure, and platforms reside, rather than at an in-house data center. 4 The
cloud could be a private network within an organization, a public network
provided by a third party vendor, or a hybrid of both. In a public network,
the applications are hosted by a third party provider and are delivered to the
end user via the Internet.' 6 End users may view their files, pictures, movies,
and emails at their visual display unit, which has access to the cloud." This,
in effect, gives users anywhere access to their applications and files stored by
the third party provider." Once information is stored in a third party cloud,
it may be retrievable years later, even if the end user deletes the information.' 9 A few of the major third party cloud-computing providers include
Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and AT&T.20
It is estimated that over sixty-nine percent of people in our country use
cloud computing for a variety of services. 2 ' Although there is a growing
trend utilizing cloud computing, the technology behind cloud computing is
11. See Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
12. Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government
Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 360-61 (2010).
13. Id.
14. Marc Jonathan Blitz, Stanley in Cyberspace: Why the Privacy Protection of the First
Amendment Should Be More Like That of the Fourth, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 357, 366-67 (2010);
see G Lakshmanan, Cloud Computing: Relevance to Enterprise, INFosYs, 2 (2009), available
at http://www.infosys.com/cloud/resource-center/documents/relevance-enterprise.pdf.
15. Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
16. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 363-64.
17. Blitz, supra note 14, at 367.
18. See David A. Couillard, Note, Defogging the Cloud: Applying Fourth Amendment
Principles to Evolving Privacy Expectations in Cloud Computing, 93 MINN. L. REv. 2205,
2215 (2009).
19. See David S. Barnhill, Note, Cloud Computing and Stored Communications: Another Look at Quon v. Arch Wireless, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 621, 644 (2010); Email,
SURVEILLANCE SELF-DEFENSE, http://ssd.eff.org/techlemail (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
20. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361; Anderson, supranote 3.
21. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
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not new. 2 2 Increases in processor and network speeds, coupled with the ability to store data inexpensively, provided the technology for cloud computing
by the late 1990s. 23 Following this, virtualization enabled businesses to separate their software and hardware and run their applications remotely. 24 Virtualization was the impetus required to make cloud computing economically
attractive and advantageous. 25
Traditionally, many businesses have used an in-house data center IT
model. 26 This required businesses to have enough capacity to handle peak
requirements and pay the associated fixed costs of peak capacity.27 Other
fixed costs included the "cost of servers and storage, [in addition to] employee salaries and overhead." 2 8 Cloud computing offers flexibility and scalability, which enables businesses to only pay for what they actually use, or
their variable costs.29 The result is significant savings to businesses with
respect to the fixed costs associated with hardware, software, facilities, and
staff required for an in-house data center.30
It is projected that cloud computing will grow to account for a total public and private network spend of $33.1 billion by 2013.1 There are some
revenue projections as high as "$160 billion over the next few years."3 2 It is
also estimated that cloud computing technology will be deployed for the majority of IT services by 2020.33
B.

Smart Grid Technology

Another technological area that is beginning to experience significant
growth is smart grid technology. 34 With smart grid technology, utility companies are able to read meters remotely, reducing the costs of the staff and
22. Jim Cooke, The Shift to Cloud Computing: Forget the Technology, It's About Economics, Cisco, 1 (2010), available at http://www.cisco.com/web/aboutlac79/docs/pov/Shift
toCloud ComputingPOVIBSG.pdf.
23. Id. at 1-2.
24. Id. at 2.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 1.
27. See Cooke, supra note 22, at 2.
28. Id.
29. Id.; Thethi, supra note 1, at 2.
30. Cooke, supra note 22, at 2-3.
31. Id. at 5.
32. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
33. Cooke, supra note 22, at 7.
34. See Kristi E. Swartz, Energy Caution over Smart-Grid Security Southern Co. Says
New Meters' Full Potential Needs Further Testing. Breaches Could Expose Data, Cause
Blackouts, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 4, 2011, at A8.
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transportation required to read a meter on site. 35 Energy usage may be
tracked and managed not only by the utilities, but also by consumers.36 The
technology involves a decentralized system, two-way information flow, and
two-way energy flow. 37 Smart grid technology requires a collaborative effort
between "the IT industry, the telecom industry, the [I]nternet industry, the
cyber-security industry, the appliance manufacturing industry, the meter
manufacturing industry, and many more industries." 38 President Obama announced $3.4 billion in smart grid investment grants in 2009.39 The United
States Department of Energy predicts that over fifty-two million more meters
will be installed by 2012.0
Experts in this area claim that the technology will result in a more efficient, secure, and reliable system. 4 1 It is predicted that with smart grid technology, electrical vehicles will "reduce our [country's] dependence on foreign oil by fifty-two percent."42 Additionally, with smart grid, it is estimated
that overall consumption will be reduced by up to four percent.4 3 A few million metric tons of carbon dioxide is projected to be saved by 2030 with the
use of smart grid, making it a green technology. 4 Furthermore, smart grid
technology decreases the possibility of outages with its self healing characteristic, which would contribute to a significant cost savings because it is
estimated that blackouts can account for $135 billion to commercial customers. 45 Finally, it is estimated that 280,000 jobs would be created with the
implementation of smart grid technology.4 6
III.

CURRENT LEGAL AND STATUTORY STANDARDS REGARDING PRIVACY

Privacy concerns affect both the cloud computing and smart grid technology industries.47 Consumers and businesses may hesitate to subscribe to
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Energy BarAssociation Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 84.
38. Id. at 93.
39. Press Release, The White House, President Obama Announces $3.4 Billion Investment to Spur Transition to Smart Energy Grid (Oct. 27, 2009) (on file with The White House);
Cheryl Dancey Balough, Privacy Implications of Smart Meters, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 161,
161 (2011).
40. Balough, supra note 39, at 162.
41. Energy BarAssociation Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 85.
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 88, 89.
45. Id. at 89.
46. Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid,supra note 1, at 89.
47. Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4.
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services which expose them to the risk of unauthorized access to their private
information.4 8 Given the tremendous impact that the telecommunications
and energy industries have on the economy, it would be ideal to address the
privacy issues now, rather than later.49
A.

Privacy Issues and the FourthAmendment

End users of both cloud based and smart grid technologies are susceptible to privacy invasion.50 The nature of cloud computing lends itself to the
risk of insecure transmission of data." Even with some forms of encryption,
hackers are still able to access private information.5 2 Risks to the end users
are especially significant "when they [are] connect[ed] to ... public wireless
networks.""
Cloud computing services are not only exposed to cyber security issues
involving potential hackers, but also are exposed to government access to
private files and documents without a warrant in certain circumstances. 54
The Fourth Amendment states that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Digital search and seizure using third party providers is much easier
than retrieving documents from a personal computer.5 6 In a digital environment, "law enforcement agents can obtain wiretaps, emails, text messages or
real time phone location information."5 It has previously been alleged that
information from a third party cloud computing provider has been directly
transmitted to government servers without a warrant. 8 In some cases, the
government has been accused of having access to the entire network of a
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4.
See Balough, supra note 39, at 161-65.
Id. at 165; Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
See Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
See id.
Id. at 372.
Id. at 361-62.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Soghoian, supra note 12, at 386-87.
Id. at 385.
Id. at 385-86.
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provider, which would enable the government to monitor an individual without involving the provider at all. 59
Similarly, there are also privacy concerns with smart grid technology."
It is not absolutely clear just how much information the new and future smart
meters will be able to accumulate. 61 The information obtained by the utility
would include all of the energy consumed within a home and might also include additional information, such as the energy charged to an electric vehicle.62 The electric vehicle would likely be registered to a user, or a unique
identifier, so the data would follow the vehicle, even if it were charged
somewhere else. 63 The information is gathered real-time for smart devices."
There are privacy implications when personal information-such as energy
consumption within the home, and travel habits outside of the home-may
potentially be tracked real-time.65
With smart grid technology, utilities currently use the Internet or other
public networks to transfer the data.66 The experts in the industry recognize
that the smart grid system will be vulnerable to cyber attacks, and to authorAdditionally, "[u]tilities themselves
ized access to private information.
[may also] pose a threat to ... data" security through their internal monitoring and maintenance of the smart grid. Other concerns with smart meters
include the possibility of information remaining from previous homeowners,
if not erased from the smart meter, and unauthorized landlord access in a
rental situation.
In the smart grid environment, law enforcement officials have previously used energy consumption data as an information tool.70 The officials
were able to use excessive energy consumption data to obtain warrants to
access homes where they suspected marijuana might be grown because of the
high energy usage. 7 1 Currently, it is not clear who owns the smart grid data-the end user or the utility.7 2 Third party cloud computing providers and
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
1, at 87.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 386.
Balough, supra note 39, at 162-63.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 166-67.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 166.
See Balough, supra note 39, at 165-67.
Id. at 168.
See id. at 169; Energy Bar Association Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note
Balough, supra note 39, at 169.
Id. at 171.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 173.
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utilities similarly face the challenge of unauthorized access of private information and Fourth Amendment privacy issues.73
B.

ECPA Statutory Requirement

Digital Due Process is a coalition of major carriers including: AT&T,
AOL, Amazon, Microsoft, and others calling for a reform of the ECPA.74
The ECPA is made up of "the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act
(SCA), and the use of pen register information."" Whether the government
is required to obtain a search warrant, or only a court order, is determined by
how the communication is interpreted.76 If the communication is interpreted
On the
to fall under the Wiretap Act, then a search warrant is required.
may
order
only
a
court
other hand, if a communication falls within the SCA,
78
be required for government access.
The main issue that the Digital Due Process coalition aims to address is
the lack of a warrant requirement for a third party provider to disclose private
communications and information to the government. 79 The coalition bases
its argument on the need for Fourth Amendment protection in the cloud
computing environment.80 Quoting Justice Brandeis, the coalition emphasizes that privacy is "the most comprehensive of rights, and the right most
valued by a free people."si
The ECPA does not clearly and effectively define how interception of
modern day communications, such as email, should be treated. 82 By definition, a cloud computing provider is both an electronic communications service and a remote computing service. An electronic communication service

73.

Balough, supra note 39, at 165; Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.

74.

About the Issue, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?

objectid=37940370-2551-11 DF-8E02000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012); Who We
Are, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS,

http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=DF652CEO-

2552-l1 DFB455000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
75. Andrew William Bagley, Don't Be Evil: The Fourth Amendment in the Age of
Google, National Security, and Digital Papersand Effects, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 153, 167
(2011).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79.

See Our Principles, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?

objectid-99629E40-2551-1 IDF-8E02000C296BAl63 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
80. About the Issue, supra note 74.
81. Id.
82. Bagley, supra note 75, at 167-70.
83. See id. at 169.
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84
provides users with the ability to send and receive electronic information.
A remote computing service, on the other hand, includes third party remote
Under the United States Code sections 2703(a)
storage and applications.
and 2703(b)(1)(B), after 180 days of an electronic communication, the government can compel a third party provider to release content information of
that communication without a warrant and without the higher burden of
probable cause.86

[Section] 2703. Required disclosure of customer communications
or records
(a) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in Electronic
Storage.-A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a
provider of electronic communication service of the contents of a
wire or electronic communication, that is in electronic storage in
an electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty
days or less, only pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in
the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by
a court of competent jurisdiction. A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications
services of the contents of a wire or electronic communication that
has been in electronic storage in an electronic communications
system for more than one hundred and eighty days by the means
available under subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in a Remote
Computing Service.-(1) A governmental entity may require a
provider of remote computing service to disclose the contents of
any wire or electronic communication to which this paragraph is
made applicable by paragraph (2) of this subsection(A) without required notice to the subscriber or customer, if
the governmental entity obtains a warrant issued using the procedures described in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in
the case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) by
a court of competent jurisdiction; or

84. See id. at 167-68.
85. See id. at 168-69.
86. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a-b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
III 2009); see Bagley, supra note 75, at 168.
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(B) with prior notice from the governmental entity to the subscriber or customer if the governmental entity(i) uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a Federal
or State statute or a Federal or State grand jury or trial subpoena;
or
(ii) obtains a court orderfor such disclosure under subsection (d) of this section;
except that delayed notice may be given pursuant to section
2705 of this title.17

The advances in technology have made the ECPA outdated and insufficient in addressing privacy concerns.8 8 The standards have not been consistently applied by courts and there is no adequate protection of personal information. 89 The main changes in technology that are not adequately addressed by the ECPA are email, cell phone location data, cloud computing
and social networking, and smart grid data.90
The ability of the government to obtain electronic communications from
a service provider without a warrant requirement9 ' demonstrates the problem
that the coalition of Digital Due Process aims to correct. 92 There were seventeen class action cases in 200 6 93 where the major telecommunications companies had allegedly partnered with the National Security Agency (NSA) to
monitor phone calls and voluntarily provide information to the government. 94
The government had access to the information without obtaining a warrant.
The telecommunications companies were given legal protection when President Bush signed legislation granting immunity to the telecommunication

87. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (emphasis added).
88. About the Issue, supra note 74.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See Bagley, supra note 75, at 174.
92. See Background, DIGITAL DUE PROCESS, http://www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.
cfm?objectid=C00D74CO-3C03-1 IDF-84C7000C296BA163 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
93. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1333
(J.P.M.L. 2006).
94. See Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 900 (N.D. Ill. 2006); Hepting v.
AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974, 978, 988 (N.D. Cal. 2006); In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 444 F. Supp. at 1334.
95. See Terkel, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 900, 911; Hepting, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 978.
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96
providers when assisting government in the fight on terrorism. The NSA
may have continued to intercept email and phone communications into
2009.9'
Turning to the energy industry, the ECPA may provide some protections if a smart meter is considered to fall within the definitions under the
Wiretap Act, where law officials would have to obtain a warrant for access to
the information." Under the Stored Communications Act, however, the level
of privacy protection will depend on how the smart grid is defined." If the
smart grid is categorized as a remote computing service, then after 180 days
of the data storage, the government could compel the utility to release the
content of the information without a warrant.1"
Given the technology movement toward remote storage of data, it is
predictable that smart grid technology will ultimately be treated similar to
cloud computing, i.e., as an electronic communication service and a remote
computing service."o' The technologies in the industries are converging in
that there is an integration of IT and Operational Technology (OT). 10 2

"There is a strong push to .

.

. use .

.

. broadband, instead of utility-owned

wires, for the transfer of smart meter data back to the utilities."tos However,
the technology currently available allows for the direct communication of the
smart meter to the utility." One supplier of smart meters explains:
Gathering real-time data from intelligent endpoints provides
the brainpower that drives the smart grid. [This supplier] outfits a
variety of intelligent endpoints with its Communications Module
to gather and relay this information.

The .

.

. Communications

96. Bagley, supra note 75, at 157 n.16; James Risen, Bush Signs Law to Widen Reach for
Wiretapping: RestrictionsAre Eased, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2007, at Al.
97. Bagley, supra note 75, at 159.
98. See Balough, supra note 39, at 177.
99. Id. at 179.
100. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b)(1) (2006 & Supp.
111 2009).
101. See Jesse Berst, Breakthrough Best Practicesfor Blending IT and OT-Lessons from
Duke and Accenture, SMART GRID NEWS.COM (July 7, 2011), http://www.smartgridnews.com
/artman/publishlBusinessLessons Learned/Breakthrough-best-practices-for-blending-ITand-OT----lessons-from-Duke-and-Accenture-3797.html.
102. Id.
103. Balough, supra note 39, at 168.
104. See Intelligent Endpoints with Brains, SILVER SPRING NETWORKS, http://www.
silverspringnet.com/products/intelligent-endpoints.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
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Modules support two connections-one into the utility's smart
grid network and one into the consumer's home area network. 05
In other words, the utility is able to gather the real-time data because the
communicating devices, or intelligent endpoints, reside at the end user's
home and at the utility.1" This is analogous to a cloud computing provider
gathering data communicated between a computer residing at a residence and
the cloud. Therefore, it is predictable that the same privacy issues that are
currently faced by the cloud computing providers will be faced by the utilities in the near future with the universal implementation of the smart grid.'
C.

Katz v. United States and the Reasonable Expectationof Privacy Test

The modem standard for privacy with regard to electronic surveillance
In Katz, the FBI attached an electronic listening and
is based on Katz.'
recording device to the outside of a phone booth and monitored the petitioner's conversations during phone calls he made while in the phone
booth.'09 The Supreme Court of the United States was asked to address
whether a public telephone booth is a protected area of an individual's right
to privacy."o The Court reasoned that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places."' 1 ' The Court stated:
One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him,
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled
to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world. To read the Constitution more narrowly is
to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play
in private communication.112

105. Id.
106. Id.; see News Release, AT&T, AT&T to Offer Wireless Smart Grid Technology to
Utility Companies (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://www.att.com/gen/press-room?pid=48
00&cdvn=news&newsarticleid=26613&mapcode=enterprise/mk-att-sustainability.
107. See Balough, supra note 39, at 161-62, 171-72.
108. Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511
(2010).
109. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
110. Id. at 349.
Ill. Id. at 351.
112. Id. at 352.
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The standard explained in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz is
followed today and is the reasonable expectation of privacy test.11 3 The reasonable expectation of privacy standard has two prongs.1 4 Under the first
5
prong, an individual must subjectively have an expectation of privacy."
Under the second objective prong, society would have to recognize it as a
reasonable expectation of privacy."' 6
There has been criticism of the subjective nature of the Katz test and
some inconsistent results in applying the reasonable expectation of privacy
standard."' 7 For example, in Oliver v. United States,"' the Supreme Court of
the United States held that a person does not have a reasonable expectation
of privacy for activities conducted in fields that could have been seen by
lawful aerial surveillance." 9 In Oliver, two agents approached a farmhouse,
followed a footpath around a locked gate, and entered into a field where marijuana was grown.120 The Court explained that an expectation of privacy in
open fields is not one that society would recognize as reasonable.121 The
Court held that no expectation of privacy attaches to open fields.122
However, in Bond v. United States,123 the Court distinguished between
visual and tactile observation of property.124 In Bond, a bus passenger's luggage was placed in the overhead storage area.125 A border patrol agent
squeezed the luggage as he walked through the bus.12 6 The Court applied the
two pronged reasonable expectation of privacy test.127 Under the first prong,
the passenger was found to expect privacy because he placed his belongings
in an opaque bag and positioned the bag directly above him.128 Under the
second prong, the Court explained that a bus passenger may expect some
handling of the bag, but not handling in an exploratory manner.129 The Court
113.
ring)).
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Solove, supra note 108, at 1511 (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurKatz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
466 U.S. 170 (1984).
Id. at 178-79.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 180.
529 U.S. 334 (2000).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 335.
Id.
Id. at 338.
Bond, 529 U.S. at 338.
Id. at 338-39.
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held that the physical manipulation of the bus passenger's luggage violated
the Fourth Amendment, even though the bag was exposed to public handling
in an overhead compartment.130
Additionally, in Kyllo v. United States,'3 ' law enforcement used a thermal imaging device to detect the heat generated from lamps used for indoor
marijuana growth.132 The Court held that this was an intrusion into the protected area and would constitute a search.' 33 The Court also emphasized that
this type of technology is not in general public use.'" The Court stated that
the "[t]he fact that equivalent information could sometimes be obtained by
other means does not make lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth
Amendment." 35 Justice Stevens, dissenting, argued that heat waves that are
generated "enter the public . . . if and when they leave a building."' 36 According to the dissent, "[a] subjective expectation that [heat waves] would
remain private is not only implausible, but also surely not 'one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.""3 "
3 8 the Supreme Court of the
Most recently, in United States v. Jones,1
United States reverted to trespass analysis in deciding that the physical attachment of a GPS tracking device on the defendant's vehicle constituted a
trespass of a constitutionally protected "effect." 39 The Supreme Court of the
United States did not apply the Katz test, but explained that "unlike the concurrence, which would make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass
the exclusive test." 4 0 Therefore, the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
test continues to apply.141

130.
131.
132.

Id.
533 U.S. 27 (2001).
Id. at 29.

133.

Id. at 34.

134.
135.
136.
137.
ring)).
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id. at 35 n.2.
Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 43-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 44 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurNo. 10-1259, slip op. (U.S. Jan. 23, 2012).
Id. at 4, 10 & n.8.
Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).
Id.

Published by NSUWorks, 2012

15

Nova Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 5

NOVA LAW REVIEW

536
D.

[Vol. 36

Supreme Court of the United States Evades FourthAmendment Issue in

City of Ontario v. Quon
There is not a significant amount of case law applying Fourth Amendment protection in electronic communications.14 2 Some believe that the current case law "leaves more questions than answers" regarding whether the
Fourth Amendment applies in government access to electronic communications.143 The Supreme Court of the United States had an opportunity in Quon
to address issue of Fourth Amendment protection with respect to text messaging.'"
In Quon, a city employee claimed that his Fourth Amendment privacy
rights were violated when the city "read text messages sent and received on
[his] pager." 45 The Supreme Court of the United States avoided taking a
stand on the Fourth Amendment issues.14 6 "The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become clear." 4 7 Because the pager
was owned and issued to the employee from the employer, the Court explained that "prudence counsels caution" in defining privacy expectations of
employees using employer provided communication devices.14 8 Although
the Court acknowledged that cell phone and text message communications
are highly personal, the Court also explained that these devices could be purchased by individuals themselves.1 49
The Court reasoned that there are exceptions to the general rule of warrantless searches, and that "'special needs' of the workplace justify one such
exception."o50 The issue of whether there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy was not necessary to resolve"' because the Court held that the city's
review of its employee's text messages was reasonable under the exception
regarding "'special needs' of the workplace." 52 Therefore, the reasonable
expectation of privacy regarding electronic communications has not been
clearly addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States.'5
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
.149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See Blitz, supra note 14, at 372.
Bagley, supra note 75, at 171.
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624 (2010).
Id. at 2624.
Blitz, supra note 14, at 373.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2629.
Id.
Id. at 2630.
Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987)).
See id.
Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
See id.
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The Third Party Doctrine

The third party doctrine is thought by some to be "disguised as an application of Katz's 'reasonable expectation of privacy' standard.154 The
logic in support of the third party doctrine is that if an individual discloses
information to a third party, then it is not reasonable for the individual to
have an expectation of privacy.155 The third party doctrine is pertinent to
third party cloud computing providers, and will be pertinent to smart grid
utilities, because data is turned over to and stored remotely by the third party
providers. 156
In Smith v. Maryland,157 telephone numbers dialed from the petitioner's
home were recorded using a pen register installed by the telephone company
at the request of the police.'58 The police did not obtain a warrant or court
order for access to the information.1 59 The Supreme Court of the United
States distinguished a pen register from the listening device in Katz, because
the register only disclosed the telephone numbers that the petitioner dialed
not the conversations.160 The Court reasoned that by disclosing the telephone
numbers to the phone company, the petitioner could not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy because the phone company uses the information to
complete the calls and bill the end user.161
Likewise, in United States v. Miller,'6 2 a bank provided the petitioner's
checks, deposit slips, financial statements and monthly statements to
agents.163 The Supreme Court of the United States differentiated between an
individual's private papers and the bank's business records. M The Court
further explained that the documents contained only information willingly
communicated to the bank.16 5 Justice Powell stated that "[t]he depositor
154. Orin S. Kerr, The Case for the Third-Party Doctrine, 107 MicH. L. REV. 561, 561
(2009).
155. Id. at 563; see United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976), supersededby statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697, as recognized in SEC
v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735 (1984).
156. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2215.
157. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
158. Id. at 737.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 741.
161. Id. at 742.
162. 425 U.S. 435 (1976), supersededby statute, Right to Financial Privacy Act, Pub. L.
No. 95-630, 92 Stat. 3697, as recognized in SEC v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735
(1984).
163. Id. at 438.
164. Id. at 440.
165. Id. at 442.
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takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another, that the information will be
conveyed by that person to [another]."' 66
Critics of the third party doctrine claim that it is incorrectly applied to
the Katz test.'67 It has been argued that it is reasonable to "expect privacy
[of] bank records, phone records, and other third-party records." 6 8 Another
view is that the third party doctrine gives the government too much power. 6 9
With the advances in technology and public access to the Internet, the third
party doctrine is thought to be insufficient in addressing the modern information era.170 An additional criticism is that the doctrine was articulated prior
to data storage in the cloud and should not apply to a third party provider and

its end users.171
On the other hand, benefits of the third party doctrine may often be
overlooked.172 Some contend that the rule ensures "technological neutrality
in Fourth Amendment rules." 73 For example, the third party doctrine prevents criminals from conducting their crimes privately and hiding the public
aspects of those crimes.17 4 Without the third party doctrine, criminals would
be enabled to conceal their crimes.7 s Another argument in defense of the
third party doctrine is that when users divulge information to a third party,
they are impliedly consenting under the Fourth Amendment.17 6
F.

Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Cloud

The question is, "when do people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in data stored in the cloud?"' 77 Likewise, when will people have a reasonable expectation of data generated from a smart meter? Some view the
Internet as a public space where there can be no reasonable privacy expectation.' 8 However, several factors support an individual having a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using third party providers. 7 9 First, a user account
166.
167.

Id. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1971)).
Kerr, supra note 154, at 570.
168. Id. at 571.
169. Id. at 572.
170. See id. at 573.
171. Bagley, supra note75, at 174.
172. Kerr, supra note 154, at 573.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Bagley, supra note 75, at 175.
177. Bamhill, supra note 19, at 621.
178. Couillard, supra note 18, at 2221.
179. See Bagley, supra note 75, at 176-77.
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is typically protected by a password and personal login.180 Password protection, in itself, would lead one to have an expectation of privacy.' 8 ' In addition, an individual's private account is not accessible to public view.182 Furthermore, the nature of photographs, calendars, and other private files is
highly personal. 83 Moreover, it is reasonable to have an expectation of privacy when conducting a search for information on the Internet in the privacy
of one's home, or in the privacy of using one's personal devices.
Individuals' privacy expectations are no longer confined to the protected area of the home, but also include their password-protected activities
and accounts.'8 5 However, "web searches, emails, documents, photos, location data, and even evidence of acquaintanceship can be extracted from a
user account." 86 Data from calendars, voicemails and instant message logs
are also retrievable. 87 It has been suggested that this type of information
could even possibly be used for criminal profiling.'88
The third party doctrine has not been adapted for the post-Katz cloud
computing environment, nor has it been adapted for the smart grid era. 89
The third party doctrine must take into account modern society's expectations that private password protected information, whether stored remotely or
on a desktop, or generated from a smart meter is not accessible to the general
public.190 Some contend that "[1]ooking at expectations is the wrong inquiry"
all together.' 9'

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. at 176.
Id.
Id.
Couillard, supra note 18, at 2219-20.
Bagley, supra note 75, at 170-71.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 164.
Couillard, supra note 18, at 2219.
Id. at 2231-32.
Solove, supra note 108, at 1524.
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IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS REGARDING PRIVACY AND
POTENTIAL EXCEPTIONS

A. The ProposedElectronic CommunicationsPrivacyAct Amendments Act
of 2011
Proposed legislation, introduced in May 2011, attempts to address some
of the privacy concerns with respect to electronic communications. 19 2 The
Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011 aims to
"improve the provisions relating to the privacy of electronic communications."l93 This paper focuses on sections two and three of the bill:
Sec. 2. Prohibition on Disclosure of Content.
Section 2702(a)(3) of title 18, United States Code, is amended
to read as follows:
(3) A provider of electronic communication service, remote
computing service, or geolocation information service to the public
shall not knowingly divulge to any governmental entity the contents of any communication described in section 2703(a), or any
record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer
of such provider or service.
Sec. 3. Elimination of 180-Day Rule and Search Warrant Requirement; Required Disclosure of Customer Records.
In General.-Section 2703 of title 18, United States

(a)

Code, is amended(1) by striking subsections (a), (b), and (c) and inserting the

following:
(a) Contents of Wire or Electronic Communications in Electronic Storage.(1) In general.-A governmental entity may require the
disclosure by a provider of electronic communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation information service of the
contents of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic
192.

See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.

1011, 112th Cong. (2011).
193. Id.
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storage with or otherwise held or maintained by the provider if the
governmental entity obtains a warrant issued and executed in accordance with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the
case of a State court, issued using State warrant procedures) that is
issued by a court of competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure.
(2) Notice.-Except as provided in section 2705, not later
than [three] days after a governmental entity receives the contents
of a wire or electronic communication of a subscriber or customer
from a provider of electronic communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation information service under paragraph
(1), the governmental entity shall serve upon, or deliver to by registered or first-class mail, electronic mail, or other means reasonably calculated to be effective, as specified by the court issuing the
warrant, the subscriber or customer(A) a copy of the warrant; and
(B) a notice that includes the information referred to in
section 2705(a)(5)(B)(i).
(b) Records Concerning Electronic Communication Service,
Remote Computing Service, or Geolocation Information Service.(1) In general.-Subject to paragraph (2) and subsection
(g), a governmental entity may require a provider of electronic
communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation
information service to disclose a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber or customer of the provider or service (not
including the contents of communications), only if the governmental entity(A) obtains a warrant issued and executed in accordance
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (or, in the case of a
State court, issued using State warrant procedures) that is issued by
a court of competent jurisdiction directing the disclosure;
(B) obtains a court order directing the disclosure under
subsection (c);
(C) has the consent of the subscriber or customer to the
disclosure; or
(D) submits a formal written request relevant to a law
enforcement investigation concerning telemarketing fraud for the
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name, address, and place of business of a subscriber or customer of
the provider or service that is engaged in telemarketing (as defined
in section 2325).194
The proposed legislation addresses the search warrant requirement for
contents of electronic communications stored by cloud computing providers.19 5 However, it does not attempt to include smart grid technology.' 96 It is
not clear how the smart meter would be defined.' 97 The proposed legislation
should include consideration for smart meter technology because it seems
that the energy industry will be faced with the same Fourth Amendment privacy issues as the telecommunications providers.19 8 Otherwise, the courts
will be left struggling with whether a smart meter may be categorized as an
electronic communication service, remote computing service, or geolocation
information service.1 99 It would be a better use of resources to address these
industries and technologies together, based on the synergies of the industries
and the interests of the taxpayers for efficient use of government and judicial

resources.200
B.

Exceptionsfor the ProposedLegislation to Consider

As mentioned previously, the third party doctrine is thought to be insufficient in addressing the modem information era.20' If the proposed legislation passes, it will clearly establish a warrant requirement for government
access to the content of stored third party cloud information.202 However, in
addition to the third party doctrine, there are two other exceptions that should
be considered in addressing the modern information era-the independent
source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule.203 If the above proposed
legislation is adopted, and a warrant is required for access to the information
stored in the cloud or with a third party, then the independent source doctrine
and the inevitable discovery rule may undermine its purpose.
194. Id. §§ 2-3.
195. See id.
196. See id.
197. Balough, supra note 39, at 172.
198. Id.
199. See id.
200. See Berst, supra note 101.
201. Kerr, supra note 154, at 573.
202. Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S. 1011, 112th
Cong. §§ 2-3 (2011).
203. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
444 (1984).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol36/iss3/5

22

Bedley: A Look at the Proposed Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amen

2012]

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
I.

543

The Independent Source Doctrine

Under the independent source doctrine, evidence that is first discovered
unlawfully, but later is obtained in a lawful manner that is independent of the
first discovery, is admissible.20 In Segura v. United States,205 the Supreme
Court of the United States addressed the issue of whether items discovered
by agents under a valid search warrant, following an unlawful entry, should
be suppressed from evidence. 20 In Segura, agents entered into and remained
in an apartment for nineteen hours awaiting a search warrant while the lawful
occupants were taken into police custody.207 After the warrant issued, the
agents discovered drugs, ammunition, cash, and records. 208 The Court held
that the evidence discovered pursuant to the warrant was admissible, and
only the evidence that was discovered prior to the warrant was suppressed. 20
The Court reasoned that none of the information on which the warrant was
secured was derived from the initial entry, and the information was known to
the agents prior to the entry. 210 The Court stated that "the exclusionary rule
has no application [where]
the Government learned of the evidence 'from an
21
independent source."' 1
In Murray v. United States,2 12 federal agents entered a warehouse, without a warrant, to apprehend those who were seen from surveillance within
the warehouse.2 13 The agents forced entry and did not find the individuals,
but they did view burlap-wrapped bales of marijuana in plain sight.2 14 The
agents left the warehouse under surveillance and then obtained a search warrant.21215 The search warrant did not rely on the observations made in the first
unlawful entry of the warehouse and was considered to be untainted.216 The
Court explained that the independent source doctrine may apply to evidence
acquired through Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment violations.217 The
doctrine's aim is to protect society's interest of allowing juries to receive
204. Segura, 468 U.S. at 805.
205. 468 U.S. 796 (1984).
206. Id. at 804.
207. Id. at 800-01.
208. Id. at 801.
209. Id. at 813-14, 816.
210. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814.
211. Id. at 805 (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487 (1963)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
212. 487 U.S. 533 (1988).
213. Id. at 535.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 535-36.
216. See id. at 535-37.
217. Murray, 487 U.S. at 537.
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evidence of a crime by putting police in the same position they would have
been in if no violation occurred.2 18
"[T]he interest of society in deterring unlawful police conduct and
the public interest in having juries receive all probative evidence
of a crime are properly balanced by putting the police in the same,
not a worse, position that they would have been in if no police error or misconduct had occurred. . . . When the challenged evi-

dence has an independent source, exclusion of such evidence
would put the police in a worse position than they would have
been in absent any error or violation." 219
In Murray, Justice Scalia explained that "[t]o determine whether [a]
warrant was independent of the illegal entry, [the question is] whether it
would have been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred."220
In Hudson v. Michigan,2 2 1 the Supreme Court of the United States also
applied the independent source doctrine.222 In Hudson, there was a valid
warrant, but it was executed in violation of the knock and announce rule.223
Justice Scalia compared the search to the warrantless search in Segura.224 He
stated that "[i]f the probable cause backing a warrant that was issued later in
time [in Segura] could be an 'independent source' for a search that proceeded after the officers illegally entered and waited, a search warrant obtained before going in must have at least this much effect."225
2.

The Inevitable Discovery Rule

The inevitable discovery rule is inferred from the independent source
doctrine.226 The main difference is that with the inevitable discovery doctrine, derivative evidence is permissible if the police would have hypothetically discovered the evidence lawfully. 22 7 The prosecutor must show that by
a preponderance of the evidence, the challenged evidence would inevitably

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. (quoting Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443 (1984)).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
Id. at 542 n.3.
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
See id. at 600-01.
Id. at 588, 590.
Id. at 600-01.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 539 (1988).
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984).
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"have been discovered by lawful means." 228 Probable cause must have been
established for the application of inevitable discovery.229
In Nix v. Williams,230 the location of a body was disclosed to law enforcement in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. 23 1 Although Nix is
a Sixth Amendment case, the reasoning may logically apply to Fourth
Amendment cases as well.232 In the inevitable discovery situation, there is a
causal connection between the illegality and the acquisition of the evidence.233
In Nix, a nearby search team was within a few miles of discovering the
body, but was called off after the defendant brought the police to where the
body was buried.234 The Supreme Court of the United States reasoned that it
was inevitable that the body would have been found by the search team.235
The Court justified adopting the inevitable discovery rule based on the rationale of the independent source exception.236 The underlying reasoning of
both doctrines is to allow evidence that would have been available absent
any unlawful police activity.237 Nix was decided in 1984, at a time the Court
believed that "[a] police officer who is faced with the opportunity to obtain
evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a position to calculate whether the
evidence sought would inevitably be discovered."238
In one lower court decision, United States v. Rodriguez,239 one of the
defendants, King, made a statement under duress, which led to derivative
evidence. 240 The court relied on the inevitable discovery exception, and reasoned that "[u]pon consideration of all the circumstances surrounding this
search, I conclude that a team of well trained and experienced law enforce-

228. Id. at 444.
229. See id. at 443-44.
230. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
231. Id. at 435-37.
232. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
388 (5th ed. 2010) ("Although the violation in Nix involved the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, the ... analysis applies in the same manner in Fourth Amendment cases."). Additionally, the inevitable discovery doctrine is inferred from the independent source doctrine,
which does apply to Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendment cases. Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533, 537 (1988).
233. Nix, 467 U.S. at 444.
234. Id. at 436.
235. Id. at 449-50.
236. Id. at 444.
237. Id. at 443-45.
238. Nix, 467 U.S. at 431, 445.
239. 606 F. Supp. 1363 (D. Mass. 1985).
240. Id. at 1374.
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ment officers would have discovered the... evidence without King's assistance." 24 I
C.

Applying the Exceptions to the ProposedLegislation

In effect, the independent source and inevitable discovery rules are exceptions that may potentially undermine the proposed search warrant requirement for electronic communications in certain instances.242 There are
main features of electronic communications that differentiate electronic
communications from traditional paper sources and other types of evidence:
Processability, recoverability, and remote storage. 243 "Electronic [e]vidence
[i]s [a]lways [p]rocessable." 244 Traditional paper documents must be manually searched through, whereas electronic communications may be electronically searched for within seconds.245 In addition to traditional searching,
modem technology also allows for data mining, where patterns within data
are identified.246 Furthermore, it is possible to recover, preserve, and reproduce deleted files in electronic communications.2 47 These features coupled
with cloud computing technology, where files are remotely stored, are characteristics unique to electronic communications.24 8 The outdated inquiries
and standards for the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule are less burdensome in electronic evidence because of the characteristics of electronic communications.
1.

Application of the Independent Source Doctrine to the Proposed Warrant Requirement

The question in Murray of whether a warrant "would have been sought
even if what actually happened had not occurred,"249 opens the door in the
electronic world to hack now, get a warrant later.250 The Court in Murray
241. Id. at 1375.
242. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 701 So. 2d 1243, 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
243. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule 34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327, 364-65 (2000).
244. Id. at 364.
245. Id.
246. Data Mining, DATATRIAGE, http://www.datatriage.com/data-mining.php (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012).
247. Specialized Hard Drive Data Recovery Services, DATATRIAGE, http://datatriage.com
/harddriverecovery.php (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
248. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 364.
249. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 n.3 (1988).
250. See id. at 540 n.2.
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explained that the lawfully obtained search warrant did not rely on the observations made in the first unlawful entry of the warehouse.' In an electronic
communications environment, if there is an unlawful access to electronic
information stored by a third party, followed by a lawfully obtained warrant,
there is a potential argument that the lawfully obtained warrant "would have
been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred."252 The characteristics of electronic communications support the idea that the lawfully
obtained warrant would not have relied on the observations made by the first
unlawful access to the information.253 The reasoning in support of this hypothetical argument is that the second lawfully obtained warrant would have
been obtained based on the search criteria-which for this analysis assumes
was sufficient to give rise to probable cause-used to access the electronic
communication in the first unlawful access.
There are unique processes in place for investigators to conduct a search
through Internet service providers.254 For example, when dealing with Internet service providers, the agent determines what material the provider is to
retrieve, but the agent usually does not conduct the search of the provider's
computers. 255 The agent "serve[s] the warrant on the provider, ... and the
provider produces the material specified in the warrant." 256 In order to navigate through massive volumes of electronic documents,257 the provider would
use the information provided by the agent to conduct the search. 5 Next, the
agent reviews the information retrieved, and makes copies of what the agent
believes falls within the scope of the warrant.259 It follows that if an agent
started with sufficient information to give rise to probable cause, and that
information led to search criteria to be used by a provider in order to retrieve
the electronic communications, then the search criteria would always be an
independent source of what is actually retrieved.
For example, in the personal computer environment, if an agent obtains
an IP address from a victim's computer, after a cyber crime has been com251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 541-43.
See id. at 542-43 & 542 n.3.
Id. at 542-43.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., COMPUTER

CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SEC. CRIMINAL
SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 133-34 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cyber

Div.,

crime/docs/ssmanual2009.pdf.
255. Id. at 134.
256. Id. (citing Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(g) (2006 &
Supp. III 2009)).
257. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 364.
258. U.S. DEP'TOF JUST., supra note 254, at 134.
259. Id.
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mitted, and the agent, pursuant to a subpoena, compels the Internet service
provider to provide the name and address associated with the IP address, and
verifies the address, then with that information the agent typically has probable cause to search the suspect's home computer. 260 Electronic communications associated with the suspect would also likely be stored in the cloud.261
By analogy, the agent in this example would have the same probable cause to
search the cloud for the electronic communications. In other words, if the
information gives rise to probable cause to search the suspect's home computer, it will also give rise to probable cause to search the suspect's material
stored in the cloud. The sufficient information used to search and acquire the
electronic communication in the cloud would be known to the agent prior to
the search in the cloud.
The independent nature of an electronic communication search is consistent with the reasoning in Segura, where the Court stated that the information was known to the agents prior to the entry, and was, therefore, an independent source.262 The characteristic of electronic communications being
processable, based on entered search terms, supports the notion that the electronic communications "would have been sought even if what actually happened had not occurred."263 Without a focused search at the outset containing specific information, there would be potentially millions of pages of retrievable text stored as electronic documents. 26 Assuming the agent has
sufficient information to give rise to probable cause in formulating the search
criteria, the search would not be based on information found in the material
generated by the search.265
In defending against the criticism that the independent source doctrine
fosters a "search first, warrant later mentality," Justice Scalia notes that:

260.

Id. at 65.

In a common computer search scenario, investigators learn of online criminal conduct.
Using records obtained from a victim or from a service provider, investigators determine the
Internet Protocol ("IP") address used to commit the crime. Using a subpoena .. . investigators
then compel the Internet Service Provider ("ISP") that has control over that IP address to identify which of its customers was assigned that IP address at the relevant time, and to provide (if
known) the user's name, street address, and other identifying information. In some cases, investigators confirm that the person named by the ISP actually resides at that street address by,
for example, conducting a mail cover or checking utility bills.
Affidavits that describe such an investigation are typically sufficient to establish probable
cause ....

Id.
261. See Couillard, supra note 18, at 2215.
262. Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 814 (1984).
263. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 542 n.3 (1988).
264. See Scheindlin & Rabkin, supra note 243, at 366-67.
265. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 254, at 134.
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An officer with probable cause . . . would be foolish to enter the

premises first in an unlawful manner. By doing so, he would risk
suppression of all evidence .

..

[and would have] the much more

onerous burden of convincing a trial court that no information
gained from the illegal entry affected . . . the law enforcement offi-

cers' decision to seek a warrant ... .266
Based on the processable nature of electronic communications, the burden of convincing a trial court that there was no information gained from the
illegal access to electronic communications may be lessened, because in order to have retrieved the documents there must have been information obtained prior to and independent of the search to conduct the search.267 If the
information used to conduct the search was sufficient to give rise to probable
cause, and the information was used to identify search criteria, then the information was known prior to and independent of the search. Therefore, the
risk for the officer that Justice Scalia refers to, in effect, may not be as great
as it would be in dealing with others forms of evidence.268
2.

Application of the Inevitable Discovery Rule to the Proposed Warrant
Requirement

At the time Nix was decided, electronic communication as we know it
today did not exist. The reasoning in Nix that "[a] police officer who is faced
with the opportunity to obtain evidence illegally will rarely, if ever, be in a
position to calculate whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered" 269 does not apply in an electronic communication world where evidence can be backed up, restored, "mined" for patterns and irregularities, and
remotely stored.270 Stored data, on a third party computer, may be backed up
by the third party for disaster recovery purposes, which allows for restoral of
data to a previous date. 27 1 Additionally, even if an end user deletes an electronic file, it can still technically be recovered with computer forensic services.272 Furthermore, with data mining technology available, patterns in
data will reveal information that otherwise would not be obvious.273

266.

Murray, 487 U.S. at 540 n.2, 540.

267.

Cf id. at 540, 542 n.3.

268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

See id. at 539, 540.
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445 (1984).
See, e.g., Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644; see Data Mining, supra note 246.
See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
Specialized Hard Drive Data Recovery Services, supra note 247.
Data Mining, supra note 246.
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Data mining is a special process used to search electronic stored
information (ESI). The results of the data mining process will help
direct future actions in the discovery process prior to litigation.
Generally data mining refers to searching large volumes of data for
patterns and irregularities in the data. The patterns and irregularities found, in turn, trigger yet more detailed searches within the data. 274
In order to satisfy the inevitable discovery doctrine, the prosecutor only
has the burden of a preponderance of the evidence showing that the electronic communication and its contents "would have been [found] by lawful
means." 275 Again, assuming there is sufficient information to obtain a warrant, an agent has the technical ability to process, recover, or access a remote
copy in the cloud.276 In electronic communications, these characteristics
increase the likelihood that the electronic communication and its contents
would have been found with a lawfully obtained warrant.277 This may suggest that an officer would be placed in a position to accurately calculate
whether the evidence sought would inevitably be discovered, which undermines the court's reasoning in Nix.278
In applying Rodriguez, where the judge believed that a well trained
team would have discovered the evidence regardless of King's statements,279
there is a circular reasoning in electronic communications because of the
processable, restorable, and remotely stored cloud characteristics.280 In the
case where there is sufficient probable cause for a search, a well trained team
would almost always have been able to discover documents that are stored in
the cloud. 281 The reasoning that applies in the inevitable discovery doctrine
becomes circular when applied to electronic communications.282
For example, an inevitable discovery argument may arise when a lawfully seized device contains information that may also be stored in the cloud,
such as email account information.283 A potential argument is that the material relating to that account information is stored in the cloud and would be
274. Id.
275. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984).
276. See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
277. See id.
278. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
279. United States v. Rodriguez, 606 F. Supp. 1363, 1375 (D. Mass. 1985).
280. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
281. Compare Rodriguez, 606 F. Supp. at 1374-75 with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
282. Compare Nix, 467 U.S. at 445, with Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644.
283. See Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defendant Bickle's Emails at 15, United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-CR-565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL
3798225 (D. Nev. July 21, 2011).
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inevitably discovered. 2 8 In one such case, emails were obtained from Microsoft by the government with a warrant. 285 The defendant claimed that the
warrant lacked probable cause to believe that the email account would contain relevant evidence.286 The government responded that even if the warrant
lacked probable cause, the court should deny the motion to suppress based on
inevitable discovery.287 The government had lawfully seized the defendant's
cellular telephone which had email information stored on it.2 88 The government argued that "[tlo the extent that [the] email account information stored
on the defendant's seized telephone overlaps with [the] email account information obtained through the search [through Microsoft] at issue here, the
[c]ourt should not suppress that information." 289 The court did not need to
address the inevitable discovery issue. 290 Nevertheless, the government's
argument was that inevitable discovery should apply where the email account information was unlawfully obtained from the cloud provider, because
the email account information was lawfully obtained through another device,
and would have inevitably lead to the information in the cloud.29'
The aforementioned processable, recoverable, and remotely stored
characteristics support the idea that where probable cause exists, the electronic communication and its contents would have been inevitably found
with a lawfully obtained warrant, regardless of a prior unlawful access.292
The underlying aim of both the independent source doctrine and the inevitable discovery rule is to protect society by putting police in the same position
they would have been in if no violation occurred.293 The nature of electronic
communications and applications in the cloud may put police in the same
position as they would have been in if no search warrant violation had occurred because of the unique characteristics of electronic communications. 294

284. See id.
285. United States v. Bickle, No. 2:10-cr-00565-RLH-PAL, 2011 WL 3798225, at *I (D.
Nev. June 21, 2011).
286. Id. at *1-2.
287. Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defendant
Bickle's Emails, supra note 283, at 15.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 16.
290. See Bickle, 2011 WL 3798225, at *5, *22-23.
291. Government's Response to Defendant's Notice to Suppress Evidence of Defendant
Bickle's Emails, supra note 283, at 15.
292. See id. at 15-16 (citing Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984)).
293. See Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 541 (1988).
294. See Barnhill, supra note 19, at 644-45.
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CONCLUSION

The Obama administration opposes changes to the existing ECPA,
which would make it more difficult for the government to obtain access to
the content of electronic communications. 29 5 "[T]he Obama administration
testified that imposing constitutional safeguards on email stored in the cloud
would be an unnecessary burden on the government. Probable-cause warrants would only get in the government's way."296 Nevertheless, the economy would benefit if more users felt secure about cloud computing, and storing their information with third party providers.29 7
Cloud computing decreases IT costs and increases overall efficiencies,
which has a positive impact on the financial health of corporations. 2 98 Financially healthy corporations can hire more people, who in turn will have more
disposable income to spend, which will benefit the economy. The size of the
cloud computing industry, especially if looked at in combination with the
energy industry, is significant enough to have an impact on the economy. 299
However, consumers do not want compromised Fourth Amendment rights
and will hesitate to convert to a technology where the government has access
to the content of their stored electronic communications.
The counter argument to the current administration's position is presented by the Digital Due Process coalition, arguing that Fourth Amendment
privacy issues are not sufficiently protected under the ECPA and calling for
reform.o' In particular, the lack of a search warrant requirement, for access
to the content of communications stored for more than 180 days, leaves consumer data susceptible to government access. 302 The legal protections have
not kept up with technology, and the proposed legislation is a step toward
providing Fourth Amendment protection to consumers. 30 3 As more consum295. The Electronic Communications Privacy Act: Promoting Security and Protecting
Privacyin the Digital Age: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary Comm. 3, 5, 6 (2010) (statement
of James A. Baker, Assoc. Deputy Att'y Gen. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice), available at
http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/1 11-2/09-22-10-baker-electronic-comm-privacy-act.pdf;
David Kravets, Justice Dept. to Congress: Don't Saddle 4th Amendment on Us, WIRED (Apr.
7, 2011,4:06 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatleve/2011/04/fourth-amendment-email-2.
296. Kravets, supra note 295.
297. See Cooke, supra note 22, at 3.
298. See id.
299. Soghoian, supra note 12, at 361.
300. See Balough, supra note 39, at 103; Cooke, supra note 22, at 4; see also About the
Issue, supra note 74.
301. See Our Principles,supra note 79.
302. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a) (2006 & Supp. III
2009).
303. See id. §§ 2-3.
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ers are comfortable with storing their private information with third party
carriers, the projected growth may be realized.
Unfortunately, the proposed legislation leaves behind smart grid technology. 304 Because of the synergies in telecommunications and energy industries, it is predictable that the same Fourth Amendment issues will arise
when smart grid technology is universally deployed.305 The economy would
benefit from the deployment of smart grid-it is estimated that 280,000 jobs
will be created. 30 In order for this to occur, consumers will need to feel
comfortable with privacy protections.307 Additionally, the use of smart grid
technology would improve the environment.30 s Judicial, government and
technical resources would be more efficiently used if both industries were
addressed together, and the proposed legislation included a warrant requirement for government access to the content of smart grid information.
Further, in order to address all the Fourth Amendment privacy issues,
the current bill should consider how the independent source doctrine and
inevitable discovery doctrine might apply to electronic communications.
Maybe safeguards aimed at avoiding these exceptions could be incorporated
into the proposed legislation. The processable and recoverable characteristics of electronic communications, coupled with remote storage in the cloud,
support the circular reasoning of these doctrines. There will be minimal risks
to the "search now, warrant later" mentality. Law enforcement agents may
be able to get around the search warrant requirement because they will be
able to easily meet the threshold inquiries of these doctrines. Consequently,
the proposed warrant requirement may be just a futile effort and may be
meaningless in certain instances. The proposed legislation might better address Fourth Amendment privacy concerns if it considered the exceptions of
the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines.

304. See generally Electronic Communications Privacy Act Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1011, I12th Cong. (2011).
305. Balough, supra note 39, at 172.
306. Energy BarAssociation Panel Discussing the Smart Grid, supra note 1, at 89.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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